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RACE AGAINST THE COURT: THE SUPREME COURT AND MINORI-
TIES IN CONTEMPORARY AMERICA. By Girardeau A. Spann. New 
York: New York University Press. 1993. Pp. vii, 266. $40. 
To engage in a serious discussion of race in America, we must begin 
not with the problems of black people but with the flaws of American 
society - flaws rooted in historic inequalities and longstanding cultural 
stereotypes. 1 
Professor Girardeau Spann of the Georgetown University Law 
Center would probably characterize the Supreme Court's perpetual 
subordination of minority interests as one of American society's key 
"flaws." Spann raises serious and thoughtful questions about the pres-
ent legal system's ability to achieve racial equality in the United States, 
tracing the current lack of racial equality to the inherently 
majoritarian Supreme Court. 
Part One, entitled "Veiled Majoritarianism," describes the 
Supreme Court's counterminoritarian propensity. In Chapters One 
and Two, Spann debunks the Supreme Court's ability to behave ac-
cording to the traditional model of judicial review, which postulates 
that the Court can perform in a countermajoritarian manner (pp. 9-
26). Here, Spann lays the historical framework for the notion of a 
countermajoritarian Court. He concludes that the Court is in fact 
counterminoritarian despite the traditional model and the safeguards 
designed to check majoritarian tendencies (pp. 19-26). He reasons, 
first, that the formal safeguards the Constitution articulates are inef-
fective. For example, Supreme Court Justices' life tenure and salary 
protection, designed to isolate the Court from political pressure, are 
inadequate for the task. Spann resolves that these formal safeguards 
have only symbolic value because they have failed to shield the Court 
from political pressure in the past and continue to perpetuate the judi-
ciary's majoritarian disposition (pp. 23-25). Second, Spann challenges 
the legal system's operational safeguards, including its dependence on 
principled adjudication. This dependence fails to arrest the Court's 
counterminoritarian tendencies because the judicial discretion inher-
ent in the process of principled adjudication does not prevent the per-
meation of majoritarian values (p. 26). 
Furthermore, Spann contends that Supreme Court Justices cannot 
protect minority interests because they are indoctrinated with 
majoritarian ideologies throughout the confirmation process. He ar-
gues that this indoctrination penetrates the Justices' ideologies in such 
a way and to such an extent that they are unable to avoid complete 
conversion to a majoritarian mentality (pp. 20-23). Moreover, these 
1. CoRNEL Wrsr, RAcE MA.TIERS 3 (1993). 
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Justices invoke majoritarian ideologies both consciously and uncon-
sciously. Neither the formal nor the operational safeguards can 
counteract the infiltration of internalized majoritarian values. First, 
the formal safeguards cannot subvert the unconscious reliance upon 
majoritarian ideologies (p. 25). Second, the procedural safeguards 
necessarily involve a certain degree of judicial discretion; the Justices' 
majoritarian inclinations affect their use of this discretion (p. 26). Jus-
tices use their discretion to derive legal principles, to decide which 
legal principles to use, and to select among the outcomes various legal 
principles will produce (p. 27). This discretion results in the influx of 
majoritarian preferences. 
Chapters Three, Four, and Five explore how judicial discretion en-
ables the infiltration of majoritarian values into legal principles and 
how this discretion continues to manifest those values through the se-
lection and application of legal principles (pp. 27-82). Spann claims 
that this discretion permits Justices to invoke majoritarian preferences. 
Chapter Three argues that the Supreme Court both expressly and im-
plicitly relies upon majoritarian preferences in applying its legal prin-
ciples (p. 27). Expressly, the Court interprets legal principles to 
comport with prevailing majoritarian philosophy (p. 27). When courts 
interpret legal principles in a majoritarian manner, they cannot pre-
serve minority considerations in judicial decisionmaking (p. 31). Im-
plicitly, the Court gives effect to majoritarian preferences through 
deferential standards of review (p. 31). To support his claim, Spann 
discusses three methods the Court may employ to defer to 
majoritarian values and cites several examples of the Court's approach 
under each method. First, the Court may decline to apply heightened 
scrutiny to specific cases even though they appear to be race cases (p. 
32). Second, the Court may determine that challenged government 
entities have in fact made the difficult showing that a heightened stan-
dard of review requires (p. 32). Third, the Court may decline to pro-
tect racial minorities from a classification that adversely affects their 
interests by invoking justiciability problems to avoid reaching the mer-
its of an equal protection claim (p. 33). 
Even if the Court defines a legal principle in a manner favorable to 
minorities, majoritarian preferences can become manifest when the 
Court selects the appropriate principle. In Chapter Four, Spann ar-
gues that majoritarian preferences affect the selection of legal princi-
ples to resolve a disputed minority issue: "Selecting applicable 
principles is an act of loosely constrained discretion that once again 
creates opportunities for a judge's personal attitudes to enter into the 
decisionmaking process" (p. 36). Judicial discretion is inevitable in 
many instances, especially in cases of first impression, cases to which 
more than one statute or principle may apply, and cases in which 
characterization is necessary (pp. 36-57). 
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Then, even if a legal principle is defined and selected appropriately, 
the Court can apply it in a counterminoritarian manner. Spann's 
Chapter Five suggests that the Court applies legal principles so gener-
ally that majoritarian-influenced judicial discretion reigns (pp. 58-60). 
The Court often derives legal principles by sifting through the conflict-
ing policies associated with implementing various principles. Thus, 
Spann argues that the majoritarian Court selects the policy that best 
accords with its majoritarian preferences to the detriment of minority 
interests. Part One concludes by maintaining that the Supreme Court, 
charged with protecting minority interests, is unable to do so (p. 81 ). 
Moreover, the safeguards designed to dissuade majoritarian tendencies 
actually perpetuate them in certain instances (p. 81). 
Part Two, "Perpetuating Subordination," describes the "subtle" 
ways the Supreme Court subordinates minority interests (p. 82). 
Chapter Six posits that racial minorities can best achieve equality 
through the political process; however, minorities tend to neglect poli-
tics because of their dependence on the Court (pp. 85-86). This depen-
dence, Spann asserts, stems from the Court's "centralization" of the 
means minorities can use to seek equal treatment and its "legitimiza-
tion" of assumptions about minority legal status. First, although the 
political process is clearly the mechanism for manufacturing 
majoritarian ideology, Spann maintains that minorities achieve their 
greatest successes in the political arena (pp. 85-86). Minorities partici-
pate more successfully in the political process because politics has no 
rules and no right or wrong results (pp. 86-89). "The value of politics 
... is that it escapes the need to depend upon principle for its proper 
operation" (p. 87). Second, minorities have attained political clout in 
part through majoritarian support that, according to Spann, stems 
from minority voting strength, minority participation in voting coali-
tions, and the majority's need for self-confirmation of its sensitivity to 
minority issues (pp. 91-93). 
Still, the Supreme Court inevitably imposes majoritarian con-
structs on the political process (pp. 99-103). Although minority issues 
can advance more purposefully in the political arena than elsewhere, 
the Supreme Court responds slowly to these advancements, to the ad-
vantage of competing majoritarian interests (p. 103). In favoring 
political advancements against minority interests, the Court has estab-
lished a harmful relationship between itself and minority groups. This 
harm is perpetrated through minority groups' dependence on the 
Supreme Court for social and political gains, the centralization of 
race-relations law in a manner that limits political gains, and the legi-
timization of self-perpetuating assumptions in the field of race-rela-
tions law that discourage the pursuit of racial equality. 
In Chapter Seven, Spann argues that through Brown v. Board of 
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Education 2 and similar allegedly countermajoritarian decisions, the 
Supreme Court has lulled minorities into a sense of dependency on the 
Court for racial equality: "[Brown] is better understood as a veiled 
majoritarian effort to perpetuate minority subordination" (p. 104). 
Brown supporters represented many ideological factions who desired 
an end to segregation for personal gain but were not seeking minority 
advancement (pp. 108-09). Although the Court relied primarily on 
majoritarian interests in deciding Brown, its decision was perceived as 
a victory for minority rights. As a result, Brown seduced minorities 
into complacency by invalidating the separate-but-equal doctrine and 
purportedly solving the inadequacies in black schools. According to 
Spann, Brown's result - desegregation - has proven unworkable be-
cause most desegregated schools are predominately black and remain 
inferior to white private and suburban schools. 3 Furthermore, 
Brown's doctrine - separate-but-equal is unconstitutional - hurts 
minority efforts for equality, especially in the educational arena, where 
desegregation efforts have in many cases superseded the importance of 
gaining a quality education, and in the affirmative action arena, where 
the Court has used its prohibition of race-based classifications to elimi-
nate many affirmative action programs created through the political 
process.4 Finally, Brown's effect - minority dependency on the 
Supreme Court for protection - is detrimental to minority interests as 
a whole. Dependence on the Supreme Court distracts minorities from 
the gains that they can achieve politically and reinforces minority sub-
ordination (p. 110). 
The standards that the Supreme Court - as the centralized arbiter 
of equal protection doctrine - imposes on affirmative action programs 
have perpetuated majoritarian values aimed at stifling minority 
achievement. Spann argues in Chapter Eight that modem racial dis-
crimination is statistical and can be defeated only by allocating re-
sources statistically (pp. 120-24). The Supreme Court, however, 
defines the criteria according to which it judges discrimination in such 
a way as to defeat enactments that allocate resources on a statistical 
basis (p. 133-34). By applying a nondeferential standard - strict scru-
2. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
3. Pp. 111-14. Spann's argument is a compelling one. Indeed, desegregation probably was 
not the most effective means to transform the facilities of separate black schools into their white 
counterparts. However, Brown still retains some vitality in sparking countennajoritarian efforts. 
Even though Brown, in practice, placed black children educationally worse off in a desegregated 
system than in the previous segregated one, it arguably still served as one significant advance 
against the perpetual inequality to which blacks were subject. For an insightful discussion of 
Brown's effects, see DERRICK BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED: THE ELUSIVE QUEST FOR 
RACIAL JUSTICE 102-22 (1987). 
4. P. 109. "[NAACP General Counsel Nathaniel R. Jones] argued that segregation was it-
self the most important educational harm to be remedied because of its connection to institu-
tional racism [and that] ... there was no constitutional right to a quality education but only to an 
education that was not officially segregated." P. 114 (citing Nathaniel R. Jones, Correspondence: 
School Desegregation, 86 YALE L.J. 378 (1976)). 
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tiny - to affirmative action on the local government level, the 
Supreme Court has effectively held that only federal affirmative action 
plans are constitutional (p. 127). Minorities, however, can implement 
affirmative action plans more easily on the local level, where there is a 
concentration of minority interests (p. 134). The Court, in effect, has 
limited minority affirmative action advancements. First, minorities 
must secure increased political power to ensure the adoption of affirm-
ative action legislation. Second, affirmative action, under the Supreme 
Court's conception, relies upon the belief in a color-blind, neutral soci-
ety when, in fact, all decisions must confront the race factor (pp. 136-
49). 
Finally, the Supreme Court has legitimated three majoritarian as-
sumptions about the legal nature of racial equality. Chapter Nine de-
scribes the traditional model of judicial review, which assumes that an 
unassailable set of individual or substantive rights exist and are legiti-
mate; that the Court can legitimately explain ambiguities inherent in 
defining these rights; and that minorities cannot legitimately disturb 
this rights structure (pp. 152-54). Through the technique of "distrac-
tion,"5 these assumptions repress minorities' perceptions of the 
achievement of racial equality as well as inhibit the vigorous pursuit of 
legitimate claims (p. 157). Minorities' adherence to the Court's legi-
timization of these assumptions continues to jeopardize their pursuit 
of racial justice in America. 
Spann's critique of the Supreme Court is both cogent and provoca-
tive, yet it suffers from several deficiencies that spoil his thesis's valid-
ity. First, Spann assumes a unitary majoritarian populace with 
distinct preferences that are wholly counter to those espoused by mi-
norities. Second, Spann develops his critique of the Court's judicial 
conservatism by using notions of political conservatism. Third, Spann 
fails to analyze critically the options minorities may face in the future, 
and the options he does provide may be disastrous in operation. 
Spann never fully constructs his notion of majoritarian philosophy. 
His argument is only convincing to the extent that there exists a single 
majority with one set of preferences that contradict minority gains. 
But such a group does not exist. 6 The majority actually consists of 
people from various cultural backgrounds.7 Though these people may 
unite to fend off threats of minority gains, internal inconsistencies exist 
5. Spann asserts that the legitimization process escapes detection through distraction. Ac-
cording to Spann, "[a]rguments always rest upon underlying assumptions. When one's analyti-
cal attention is focused on the intricacies of an argument, however, the underlying assumptions 
on which the argument rests may completely escape scrutiny . . . . [Especially with controversial 
topics, the] controversy itself serves to increase the level of distraction." P. 152. 
6. Some theorists, however, do argue in favor of the existence of a silent majority. See, e.g., 
ALFRED W. HORTON, THE SILENT MAJORITY (1970). 
7. I do not mean to suggest here that cultural heritages are the only distinguishing factor 
among the majority. Other factors - including political, economic, and social interests - also 
create divisions within the majority. 
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within the group. 8 Many preferences differ from member to member; 
moreover, some interests displayed by certain members of the majority 
may parallel those of the minority group. 9 If no single set of 
majoritarian values exists, then the Supreme Court cannot effectuate a 
particular set of counterminoritarian principles that it attributes to 
and assimilates from the majority. Although the Court may indeed 
perpetuate minority subjugation, as Spann suggests, Spann's assump-
tion of veiled majoritarianism cannot account for this phenomenon. 
Another difficulty with Spann's argument is that he appears often 
to view judicial conservatism and political conservatism as inter-
changeable ideas. Spann seems to narrow the type of majoritarianism 
ideology the Court imposes to conservative majoritarianism: "The 
Supreme Court can best be understood as a representative branch that 
is politically sensitive to conservative majorities" (p. 103; emphasis 
added). The Court's inherent judicial conservatism, however, does not 
necessarily reflect political conservatism, as Spann seems to suggest. 
The conservative ideology that Spann wants to attribute to majoritari-
anism, and inevitably to the Supreme Court, may not be inherent to 
either. Majoritarianism may actually reflect some of the concepts of 
liberalism, and traditionally, liberals have strongly advocated racial 
justice. Although Spann does not necessarily espouse politically lib-
eral views, he clearly despises politically conservative beliefs.10 But if 
Spann cannot define majoritarianism in terms of political conserva-
tism, his argument against majoritarianism as perpetuating the subju-
gation of minorities remains questionable. 
Spann closes his discussion with little hope and fewer solutions. 11 
He asserts that the Court is replete with majoritarian preferences and 
Congress is, by definition, majoritarian. Minorities can obtain only a 
limited number of successes in Congress and even fewer in Court. 
Although Spann gets us over some of the hurdles to understanding the 
perpetuation of racial inequality - knowing who the competition is 
and understanding its tactics - his analysis leaves only three possibili-
8. Indeed, even the individual members' perceptions of who constitutes a minority may differ; 
for instance, whether people of Asian descent fit into the minority category is questionable to 
some. Spann does concede that some may perceive his notion of the racial majority as mono-
lithic. P. 5. He does little, however, to dispel that impression. Later, when Spann discusses the 
dangers that the emerging minority neoconservatives present, he explicitly contradicts his idea of 
a singular minority preference by recognizing the neoconservative threat within the black popu-
lace. Pp. 158-59. Other scholars have encouraged such diverse political views within the black 
community. See, e.g., WEST, supra note 1, at 59. 
9. Spann would probably dismiss divergent interests within the majoritarian group by stating 
simply that the relevant preferences here are those the majority share that disadvantage the mi-
nority quest for racial equality. However, Spann's argument that antiminority interests exist is 
weakened by his failure to articulate the scope of those interests. 
10. For a glimpse of Spann's views of conservatives, see pp. 158-59. See also supra note 8. 
11. "The terrifying truth that is legitimated by the Supreme Court's guarantee of 
countermajoritarian judicial review is that the Court's protection of racial minority interests 
appears to be perpetual. What an ingenious constitutional scheme." P. 160. 
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ties for the fate of minorities, none of which seem promising.12 Minor-
ities can perish within the system, revolt, or continually struggle for 
racial justice.13 The first possibility has clearly dire consequences, not 
only for minorities but also for the United States as a whole. The 
second possibility - revolution - is also not promising. Given the 
persistent mistrust many Americans display toward minorities, any 
minority revolt is likely to be bloody and futile. Spann's majoritarian 
government would guarantee this result: a government that perpetu-
ates majoritarian values to subordinate minorities would of necessity 
fear insurrection and prepare for it. With Spann's understanding of 
majoritarianism, the third option - struggling for racial justice - ap-
pears doomed to failure. Minorities will have little incentive for any 
struggle for racial justice unless they create some incentive fueled from 
within their own communities. 
Although Spann offers no tidy solution to the problem of a 
majoritarian Supreme Court, by revealing dangers underlying the doc-
trine of the Court regarding minority gains he may stimulate thought-
ful discussion of these issues.14 Race relations in the United States are 
definitely in need of a major overhaul. Theoretically, minorities have 
by now learned some of the rules of the race, but something, no doubt, 
is impeding their quest for equality. Spann's effort to deconstruct in a 
meaningful way the majoritarianism of the Supreme Court aims and 
succeeds respectably at uncovering some of the major hurdles to 
achieving racial equality. 
- Melissa Nicholson Starkey 
12. Spann's insights into resolution of the problems he presents reflect, to some extent, his 
status as a critical legal studies scholar. Those who criticize critical legal studies describe it as a 
quest for purpose with little result-based analysis. "Critical legal studies [does not contain] ... a 
comprehensive announcement of what a credible and realizable new society and legal system 
would look like." CoRNEL WEST, KEEPING FAITH 196 (1993). 
13. Another possibility Spann implicitly suggests is the "cultural commitment to indepen-
dence and self-sufficiency" exemplified in the black nationalism and black power movements of 
the late 1960s and early 1970s. Spann attributes these movements' decline to the rise of a 
majoritarian "rhetoric of integrationism." P. 145. 
14. Indeed, Spann does not stand alone in his skepticism of the Supreme Court's commit-
ment to the protection of individual rights. See, e.g., DAVID KAIRYS, WITH LIBERTY AND JUS-
TICE FOR SOME: A CRITIQUE OF THE CONSERVATIVE SUPREME COURT (1993). 
[T)here must be safeguards: mechanisms and institutions that vigorously protect human 
integrity, dignity, freedom, and equality, as well as a citizenry that is informed and con-
scious of history and the potential for tyranny among the best nations and peoples. This is 
the inherent message of the Bill of Rights as well as the best social vision. 
If we value and wish to guarantee these protections, the next question is the mechanism 
for their implementation .... [I]t is important to recognize that conservatives have tended to 
reject judicial protection while simultaneously rejecting protection implemented by any al-
ternative mechanism. We have adopted, in a fundamental sense, the worst of combinations: 
the courts now reject the role of protector of personal freedom, and the legislatures and 
people still defer such matters to the courts. 
Id. at 36-37. 
